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Abstract: Traffic accidents impose large costs, with 1,291 road deaths in Australia in 2011.
The total costs of road accidents were estimated to be $17 billion in 2003, equivalent to 2.3
per cent of that year’s GDP, averaging around 8.4 cents per vehicle kilometre. The
Productivity Commission has recommended replacing tort law with a compulsory,
government run first party insurance scheme, where all victims receive compensation from
the state, regardless of fault. The proposal is being implemented across Australia, NSW has
adopted it this year. Contrary to the PC’s assertions, the evidence is that no fault insurance
would increase traffic fatalities by 10-30 per cent and accidents by even more. This has
implications for the safety design of road infrastructure. An inter-disciplinary approach is
taken, in this paper, combining, law, economics and transportation engineering to examine
the interaction of legal rules, insurance arrangements, economic incentives and physical
infrastructure.
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I.

Introduction

In its 2011 “Disability Care and Support” report, the Productivity Commission recommended
replacing the current State based disability support schemes with a National Disability Insurance
Scheme (NDIS). With attention focused on this plan for multi-billion dollar increases in
spending on disability support, and its financing, receiving less scrutiny is the other
recommendation in the Productivity Commission’s report, that:
State and territory governments should create insurance schemes that would provide fullyfunded care and support for all catastrophic injuries on a no-fault basis, and that would
collectively constitute a National Injury Insurance Scheme (NIIS).
The NIIS would include all medical treatment, rehabilitation, home and vehicle modifications
and care costs, and cover catastrophic injuries from motor vehicle, medical (excluding cases
of cerebral palsy associated with pregnancy or birth, which would be covered by the NDIS),
criminal and general accidents. Common law rights to sue for long-term care and support
should be removed, though access to damages for pecuniary and economic loss, and general
damages would remain.1
The Productivity Commission recommended all states create no-fault motor accident
insurance schemes by 2013 and other forms of catastrophic injury be covered by 2015 and an
inquiry be held in 2020 to examine widening coverage to damage for pecuniary and economic
loss and to some non-catastrophic injuries.1
a
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Currently the Northern Territory, NSW, Victoria and Tasmania have no fault insurance
schemes for motor vehicle accidents, the other states have fault based tort law liability, where an
accident victim can only claim from a negligent injurer (who usually carries compulsory third
party insurance).1 The Productivity Commission’s NIIS proposal involves major changes for all.
Except for the Northern Territory (which abolished common law rights to sue for transport
accidents), the current no fault schemes are ‘add-ons’, with limited no-fault benefits. They
preserve the right to sue for damages under tort law and apply only to motor vehicle accidents.
Some require a threshold level of damage to sue under common law; others do not restrict access
to tort actions.2
The States have agreed to introduce no-fault lifetime care and support for people who are
catastrophically injured in motor vehicle accidents prior to the commencement of the NDIS
launch.3 NSW and South Australia have announced plans to convert their compulsory third party
car insurance arrangements, where drivers must insure against the risk of being held legally
liable to another (the ‘third party’), into no-fault schemes – where the driver and all victims
claim from the scheme regardless of fault. It includes, therefore, compulsory first party
insurance, where the policy holder (the first party) is insured against the risk of suffering loss.
The Productivity Commission estimates the NIIS would have cost an extra $830 million a year in
2011– to be raised from increasing compulsory third party insurance premiums for motor
vehicles, medical indemnity premiums, surcharges on rail passengers, levies on boats, increased
municipal rates and from general revenue.1 The Productivity Commission’s proposal replaces
legal liability with a compulsory, government run first party insurance scheme. The Productivity
Commission asserts:
Nor is there evidence that the common law right to sue for compensation for care costs
increases incentives for prudent behaviour by drivers, doctors and other parties.”1
This statement ignores and contradicts the vast theoretical and empirical law and economics
literature on the very issues examined in the Commission’s report: the effect of tort law and
different liability arrangements, insurance, litigation costs, settlement, and no‐fault insurance
schemes. The Commission’s proposal runs the risk of a large increase in accident costs, which
can involve substantial negative externalities. A negative externality is an uncompensated net
cost imposed by one agent on another without permission. If some of an action’s costs are born
by other people, then it may be taken even if the social costs are greater than the benefits. As a
result external costs may be incurred even if they are not worth incurring. The economic analysis
of how tort liability controls harmful externalities is one of the great accomplishments of law and
economics. It has moved the central focus of tort law towards how best to induce strangers to
take account of the full social costs of their actions and undertake optimal precautions (see
Shavell4; and Landes and Foster5).
II.

The Law and Economics Analysis of Accidents

The economic analysis of accidents starts with the observation that they are not entirely
accidental. People do not choose to have accidents, but they can take precautions to reduce the
probability and severity of accidents. For example, a motorist chooses what kind of car to drive,
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how often and what speed to drive it, how often to have its brakes checked, how much to drink
before driving and so on. These decisions and many more, affect the cost the motorist imposes
on other people.
The law and economics approach further observes that accidents are jointly determined by the
actions of all parties involved. The problem is not just to control the injurer’s behavior, the
victim’s actions also affect the probability and magnitude of harm. That is, it uses the model of
bilateral precaution. Harm from accidents is probabilistic – whether an accident will occur is
uncertain, and the probability of an accident occurring depends on the care or precautions taken
by all parties involved. For example, let L be expected accident losses (for the moment, think of it
as being per kilometer and the number of kilometers driven or walked is fixed). The injurer can
take a level of care X at a constant marginal cost of CI per unit and the victim can take a level of
care Y at CV per unit.
Then L = L(X, Y), ∂L/ ∂X < 0, ∂L/ ∂Y < 0, ∂2L/ ∂X2 > 0, ∂2L/ ∂Y2 > 0. It will be assumed that
∂2L/ ∂X∂Y > 0 (X and Y are substitutes). The efficient outcome minimises the total social costs of
accidents: the costs of prevention, the costs of injuries that nonetheless occur, the costs of
administration (such as litigation costs) and the costs of risk bearing. To achieve efficiency,
parties should take all cost justified precautions – those precautions that save more in accident
losses than the precaution costs. Ignoring litigation and risk bearing costs for now, the efficient
outcome minimizes
WXX+ WYY + L(X, Y)
(1)
At the efficient levels of care X*, Y* the necessary first order conditions are
WX = − ∂L(X*, Y*)/ ∂X ; WY = − ∂L(X*,Y*)/ ∂Y = 0.b
(2)
It is natural to ask: what set of legal rules will lead the parties to make efficient decisions. It is
a complex problem. As the first order conditions show, the optimal level of care by each party
depends on the care taken by the other party, and the decisions are taken independently and in
advance of the parties’ interaction. A decision maker has the incentive to make efficient
decisions when faced with the full social cost of his actions, including the cost imposed on
others. Then he would undertake actions only if their benefits exceed the social cost. In the
jargon, to achieve efficiency we need to internalise the externalities.
III.

The Role of Tort Law

Australia is a common law country, inheriting the body of judge made law built up in England
over the centuries. The common law is by far the dominant source of the legal rules that govern
the interactions between citizens. Victims enforce the common law and it creates incentives
through injurers having to compensate their victims. Tort law deals with externalities between
strangers – interactions outside a contractual relationship. A tort is a civil wrong: where one
party inflicts damage on another, other than from breach of contract. Contract law deals with
breaches of contract, which raises different issues – as the parties can negotiate before the
accident and adjust the contract price – and is relevant for medical malpractice and workplace
accidents.
b

The above assumptions about the derivatives of the L(X, Y) function ensure the second-order conditions
are met.
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One way of inducing people to take appropriate precautions is to make them liable for the cost
of the damage they do to others if they don’t – by allowing their victims to sue them for
damages. That is, tort damages are a way of forcing people to take account of the costs they
impose on others. If a party imposes costs on someone else, is sued and held liable – then he
must make the victim ‘whole’. That is, pay the victim damages, a sum of money that
compensates for the damage imposed, transferring the cost back to the person responsible –
internalizing the externality to bring private costs in line with social costs.
The main basis for liability for damage from accidents is the tort of negligence. Developed in
the nineteenth century, it became important after the invention of the railway, and later the motor
car. It imposes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure another. Victims must also behave reasonably and
take reasonable care – or they will be held to have contributed to the accident and be guilty of
contributory negligence. Under the common law, contributory negligence was a defense – the
defendant was not liable if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. In Australia, statute has
modified the common law so that a negligent injurer is only partially liable if the victim is also
negligent. Contributory negligence reduces the damages paid by the proportion the defendants
conduct contributed to the accident – what economists call comparative negligence. For example,
if the plaintiff is considered 40 per cent responsible for the accident, damages are reduced by 40
per cent.
IV.

How the Rule of Negligence Can Result In Optimal Outcomes

If the courts set the required standard of due care for each party at the efficient level, the
efficient outcome can result. The courts look at the conduct of the defendant and the claimant
relative to the norm of the ‘reasonable person’ to determine whether the defendant should bear
the loss, which in practice requires judges to compare the cost of a precaution against its benefit.
A reasonable person is obliged to take precautions that are cheap and eliminate a substantial risk,
but not expensive precautions against a remote risk. Further, the adversarial nature of common
law adjudication encourages the courts to think in terms of incremental changes, focusing on the
behavior of the parties. Each party tries to persuade the judge the other party did not act with
reasonable care by setting out actions the other party could have taken to avoid the accident. The
party accused of negligence counters with reasons why this would not have reduced the
likelihood of harm or would have been impractical, too expensive and unreasonable. The court
process encourages courts to require only cost justified precautions.
The prospect of being found negligent gives all parties a strong incentive to reach the standard
of due care. The following simple model shows how tort can solve the bilateral care problem and
result in efficient outcomes. As each party’s action affects the results of other parties’ actions,
and each makes their decision independently, game theory is the obvious way to model the
effects of the law. Consider an accident between an injurer and a victim. Assume:
•
•

Unilateral damage – only the victim suffers damage (think of a car running down a
pedestrian).
Risk neutrality.
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•
•
•
•

Two levels of care: due care (not liable) or no care (negligent and liable).
Damages fully compensate victims for their injuries.
No mistakes. Courts set due care at the efficient level, observe actual care taken and each
party knows the required care.
Fixed number of trips by each party.

Each of these assumptions will be relaxed later in the paper. The payoffs from the care
decisions each party must make are set out in the non-cooperative game between two parties
summarized in Table 1 (player 1’s payoffs are first in each cell). The individual strategies are
investment of resources in preventing accidents. Expected accident costs (higher is worse) are L
(i, j) where i is the motorists action and j is the pedestrian’s action. The cost of taking care for the
injurer and victim is CI and CV. Lack of care increases expected accident costs: L(D, D) <
L(D,N), L(N, D) < L(N, N).. If due care levels are set efficiently, the due level of care reduces
accident costs by more than the costs of the care (total accident costs fall when take due care)
and so: CV + L(D, D) < L(D, N), CI + L(D, D) < L(N, D), CI + L(D, N) < L(N, N) and CV + L(N,
D) < L(N, N). Combining these gives CI + CV + L (D, D) < L (N, N).
Table 1. Negligence game.

Player 1:
Motorist (injurer)

Due care

CI
L(D, N)

CI
CV+ L(D, D)

No care

(1 – b)L(N, N)
bL(N, N)

L(N, D)
CV

No care

Due care

Player 2: Pedestrian (victim)

The motorist is liable if he is negligent. If both the motorist and pedestrian are negligent, the
pedestrian bears a portion b of costs, and the motorist (1 – b). b depends on the legal rule in
force. Under pure negligence, the injurer is always liable if negligent and b = 0. The traditional
common law rule where contributory negligence is a defense, b = 1. Under comparative
negligence, b is the share of the victims blame for the accident. Each party chooses the action
that maximizes his benefits net of expected liability. As due care is set at the efficient level, a
party that expects the other to take due care will take due care. If the pedestrian takes due care
and the motorist does not, the motorist will be found negligent and bear all the accident costs. He
has a big incentive to take due care and avoid these costs. If the motorist is expected to take due
care, the victim bears all the accident costs and has an incentive to minimize them and take all
cost justified precautions.
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If CI < (1 – b)L(N, N) the motorist has a dominant strategy to take care and the Nash
equilibrium outcome is D,D the social optimum where both parties take the efficient level of
care. The motorist always takes care, and that induces the pedestrian to take the efficient level of
care. For example, this would occur under pure negligence, where b = 0. The incentive not to be
found negligent and liable gives the injurer an incentive to meet the court determined standard of
due care. If the injurer takes due care, the accident costs are borne by the victim, who then has
the incentive to take an efficient level of care.
If CV < bL (N, N) then the pedestrian has the dominant strategy to take care and the outcome
is D, D. For example, this would occur when comparative negligence is a defense.
At least one of those outcomes must be true as:
CI + CV + L (D, D) < L (N, N) = (1 – b) L (N, N) + bL (N, N)
(3)
So, at least one party has the dominant strategy to take care. The other party expects this and
so will take the efficient level of care. Each party has the duty to behave reasonably, but also the
right to act on the presumption that others are behaving reasonably. The tort of negligence gives
double responsibility at the margin. When the other takes care, each party faces the full social
cost of harm up to the required standard of care. The analysis generalises to continuous, rather
than two levels, of care. If due care is set at the efficient level, the efficient outcome results.
V.

The Role Of Insurance

Analyzing the effect of insurance requires us to drop the assumption of risk aversion, so that
there is a cost to bearing risk and a demand for insurance. For example, in the equilibrium in the
simple model of negligence, there is no negligence and no damages paid – so the victims bear the
remaining accident costs. That creates a demand for first party insurance. Tort law is bad at
providing insurance and compensation, with poor coverage (it covers only a small sub-set of
losses: where there is a negligent party to sue) and high legal costs. The accident problem
involves not only the goal of appropriately reducing the risks of accidents but also allocating and
spreading the risks of losses from accidents that do occur – protecting risk averse people against
risk. Rrisk aversion increases the incentive to meet the standard and can lead to excessive care in
the absence of insurance (when care is continuous).
The first best outcome would be for all parties to take the efficient amount of care and for
risks to be fully insured and spread; but if an insurance policy completely eliminates risk, it may
have an undesirable side effect. It removes the incentive for the insured to take care to reduce the
risk of the accident occurring, the so-called moral hazard problem.
If the insurance company can observe the care taken, it can overcome the moral hazard
problem by adjusting the premium to reflect the increase in the expected loss resulting from the
insured person’s taking less care. When care is not observable by the insurance company,
insurance is imperfect and the individual cannot reduce his premium by taking more care,
reducing the incentive to take care. If there is moral hazard, the insured takes no care and the
probability of the accident increases – this raises the premium. In equilibrium the insurance
policy must break even on the care chosen when it is accepted. This may result in the person not

International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure
October 1-4, 2013, Wollongong, Australia
insuring at all – if the moral hazard effect of increased premiums outweighs the risk spreading
benefits.
What is usually done is to provide partial insurance coverage, such as co-insurance or
deductibles or premium increases after claims, in order to induce the insured person to take some
precautions – trading off increased care against increased risk bearing. Often governments
regulate to prevent insurance companies from doing so. For example, compulsory third party
insurance in Australia tends to be uniform with no risk rating or use of co-insurance and
deductibles.
VI.

The Effect of No-Fault Insurance

The effect of no-fault insurance is illustrated with the game in Table 2. It keeps the
assumptions listed above (such as full insurance), except for risk neutrality. The motorist pays
the same premium P whether he takes care or not, so has no incentive to take costly care. The
pedestrian is fully compensated whether he takes care or not, and so has no incentive to take
care. All parties have a dominant strategy not to take care. The Nash equilibrium is that neither
party takes care, the worst outcome. Accident costs are higher when no-one takes care (L (N, N)
> L (D, D)) the premium reflects the crash costs when no-one takes care, L (N, N). Compared
with the outcome in Table 1, drivers are worse off (they now pay a premium that reflects high
accident costs) and pedestrians better off (they are now fully insured).
Table 2. No-fault insurance.

Player 1:

Due care

Motorist (injurer)
No care

CI + P

CI + P

0

CV

P

P

0

CV

No care

Due care

Player 2: Pedestrian (victim)

There is a trade-off between increased accident costs and better compensation and risk
spreading. But pedestrians always had the option of taking out first party insurance. If they chose
not to because the moral hazard effect increased premiums too much, then it is inefficient to
compel their insurance.

International Symposium for Next Generation Infrastructure
October 1-4, 2013, Wollongong, Australia

VII.

Compulsory Third Party Insurance

In the simple model of Table 1, there is no demand for third party liability insurance because
motorists have the incentive to take care; they are not negligent, and not liable. Drivers may be
found negligent because of mistakes – they may actually be negligent because they make
mistakes in the level of care taken (such as a lapse in concentration) or courts may make errors in
assessing the actual care taken and wrongly find an injurer negligent, or the driver may gamble
on the court thinking he was not negligent when he really was, and lose.
If care is continuous, court errors tend to encourage parties to take more care, greater than the
optimal level, especially if they are risk averse. The higher the level of precautions taken, the
smaller the chance of being wrongly found negligent. Risk-bearing is relevant for two reasons:
not only because potential victims may face the risk of accident losses, but also because potential
injurers may face the risk of liability. The chance of being found liable because of errors by the
court or own mistakes creates a demand for third party insurance. Voluntary third party
insurance tends to be efficient, even if it is imperfect and reduces care.
There is a trade-off between risk spreading and care – greater risk spreading reduces
incentives for care and increases accident costs. But if victims are fully compensated, that cost is
internalised in the price of the insurance, which reflects care taken under the policy, and third
parties are fully compensated for increase in accidents. Insurance is a voluntary transaction and
so it will take place only if both parties believe the gain balances the loss. If individuals choose
to purchase insurance, they reveal that the risk spreading benefits outweigh the extra accident
costs. If victims are not fully compensated, then they bear some of the extra accident costs and it
cannot be guaranteed liability insurance is desirable. Further, if liability insurance is compulsory
(as it is in Australia), it cannot be guaranteed that the risk spreading benefits outweigh the extra
accident costs.
The Productivity Commission recognizes that no-fault insurance reduces incentives to take
care, but it claims that:
in the presence of insurance, especially with little focus on risk‐rating for some causes of
injury, the common law does not provide incentives for prudent behavior by motorists and
other parties.1
and that no‐fault insurance would
currently perform no worse at deterring excessively risky behavior, as despite the appearance
of the common law, it is the insurer that pays.1
That is, the Productivity Commission claims that current compulsory third party insurance
removes any incentives for care, so that replacing the current system with no-fault insurance
would not increase accidents. But the Productivity Commission ignores a fundamental
contribution of the law and economics literature: the model of bilateral care and the importance
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of victim care. The chance of an accident depends on the actions of both the injurer and victim.
Even if we assume full, imperfect compulsory third party insurance, with no risk rating or use of
co-insurance and deductibles, and that moral hazard means the insured takes no care at all, tort
law still affects the victim’s incentive. If the injurer is negligent, the victim may claim
compensation from the insurer of the owner/driver of the 'at-fault' vehicle. But if the victim is
also at fault, the compensation may be reduced under comparative negligence, providing an
incentive for the victim to meet the standard of due care set by the courts, in order to preserve his
right to damages. Table 3 illustrates.
Table 3. Compulsory third party liability insurance.

Player 1:

Due care

Motorist (injurer)
No care

CI + P

CI + P

L(D, N)

CV + L(D, D)

P

P

bL(N, N)

CV

No care

Due care

Player 2: Pedestrian (victim)

The motorist pays the premium P whether he takes care or not, and so has a dominant strategy
to take no care. The pedestrian takes care if CV < bL (N, N). As the standard of care is set
efficiently, CV + L (N, D) < L (N, N), and so the pedestrian may meet the standard and take care.
If b = 1, as under the common law defence of contributory negligence, then the victim has an
incentive to meet the standard of care. Given compulsory third party insurance, the movement
from contributory to comparative negligence has a large potential cost, it may reduce victim care,
moving the equilibrium from N, D to N, N, increasing expected accident costs from L(N, D) to
L(N, N). Moving to no-fault insurance removes the victim’s incentive to take care, increasing
accidents.
More generally, if care is continuous, the victim may have an incentive to take due care under
compulsory third party insurance, but if not, he still has an incentive to take some care – more
than under no-fault insurance. Victims’ care is particularly important in motor vehicle accidents,
where a substantial portion of accidents involve motor vehicles crashing into each other (bilateral
damage). In 2010, multi-vehicle crashes were 42 per cent of Australian fatal road traffic
accidents.6 Drivers cannot be sure in advance whether they will be an injurer or a victim. Even
with compulsory third party insurance, tort law gives drivers an incentive to be careful in their
role as victims – so their damages are not reduced through comparative negligence.
Dropping the assumption of unilateral damage means that tort law gives drivers an incentive
to take care even with imperfect compulsory third party insurance. In fact, in the bilateral
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damage case, both drivers may have an incentive to meet the standard of due care and the
optimal outcome is reached. Again, the common law rule of contributory negligence as a defence
would ensure the worst N, N outcome, where no-one takes care, is avoided – but it is a
possibility under comparative negligence. More generally, some drivers may not have an
incentive to meet the standard, but with continuous care they would take more care than under no
fault insurance.
The Productivity Commission argues that no-fault insurance will not increase accidents
because injurers with third party liability insurance currently have no incentive to take care. But
it proposes to extend no-fault insurance to cover all general accidents, such as household
accidents, even where injurers do have compulsory third party liability insurance, reducing
incentives for injurer and victim care. Moreover, self-inflicted accidents would be covered –
such as falling off ladders or single vehicle accidents, which were 44 per cent of fatal road traffic
accidents in Australia in 2010,6 although some of the deaths are passengers. When no other
person contributes to, or is involved in, the accident, the costs of these accidents tend to be
internalised and efficient levels of accident prevention adopted (the victim and injurer are the
same person). Furthermore, people can choose to take out first party insurance and internalize the
resulting moral hazard costs. Introducing compulsory no fault insurance for general accidents,
financed through municipal rates, will externalise costs to taxpayers, reducing the incentives for
care.
VIII.

Dropping the Other Assumptions

If courts do not calculate optimal care correctly they will set the standard above or below the
efficient level. The parties may or may not meet the standard of due care. If they meet the
standard, the tort system encourages them to take some care. If they do not meet the standard,
they will be liable, will bear accident costs and have the incentive to take some care. In both
cases, tort law gives more care than no fault insurance. Victims have a greater incentive to take
care when damages only partially compensate them, so that they bear some accident costs. They
are more likely to meet the due care standard (and perhaps even exceed it) and will take some
care even under a no-fault scheme. But a no-fault scheme reduces the costs that negligent victims
bear, and reduces the incentive to take care relative to tort law with compulsory third party
insurance. Injurers have no incentive to take care under either.
A further law and economics insight that the Productivity Commission ignore is the incentive
legal and insurance arrangements give for excessive activity levels. Only observable precautions
can be made part of the court’s standard of due care, and the prospect of being found negligent
does not encourage parties to take cost-justified precautions that the court cannot observe. The
activity level is extent of participation in the activity that is the source of the accident, such as
kilometres driven. Usually courts do not include the activity level in the required standard of
care, either because they cannot observe it or cannot judge whether is excessive. The court can
judge whether the driver was negligent in how he drove but not whether he was negligent in how
much he drove--whether his marginal trip was worth taking, given the expected accident costs it
produced.
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Expected accident losses depend not only on the care exercised by each party but also on each
party’s activity level. For example, the number of car accidents depends on how many kilometres
are driven. Under a negligence rule, drivers drive too much, since having taken the efficient level
of precaution they are no longer liable for damages. Injurers do not bear the full social costs of
their activity, but impose an external cost on accident victims, who bear their accident costs.
Injurers only consider their net benefits from extra participation in the activity but not the
increase in expected victim accident costs, resulting in excessive activity levels. Under
compulsory third party insurance, accident costs that result from negligence are externalised onto
the insurance company. But the premium charged to drivers will reflect this cost – internalising
this cost for the participation decision (whether to drive at all), which may deter some from
becoming drivers (such as young high risk drivers). But as insurance premiums are some fixed
annual amount and do not vary with kilometres driven, if the driver chooses to participate, there
is still an incentive for excessive activity levels (i.e. to drive too many kilometres), with accident
costs externalised across premiums for all drivers. If damages under-compensate accident
victims, then they bear some of the external cost as well.
The per kilometre accident externality is significant. Connelly and Supangan7 estimated the
total costs of road traffic crashes in Australia as $17 billion in 2003, equivalent to 2.3 per cent of
that year’s GDP. Motor vehicles in Australia travelled an estimated 201,497 million kilometres
in the 12 months ended 31 October 2003,8 so accident costs averaged around 8.4 cents per
vehicle kilometre. No fault insurance exacerbates the activity level externality. It increases the
accident externality per kilometre through reducing care and covers a greater portion of victim
accident costs (externalising more accident costs) – both effects reducing the private cost per
kilometre driven (and walked), increasing activity levels. The Productivity Commission do not
consider this externality or policies to combat it, such as per kilometre insurance premiums.
IX.

The Likely Effects of No Fault Insurance

No-fault insurance will, therefore, increase accidents, even when replacing tort liability
combined with imperfect, non-risk rated compulsory third party insurance. No fault insurance
increases the accident rate per kilometre and kilometres driven, increasing external accident
costs. The Productivity Commission point to the large litigation costs associated with tort law,
but the litigation costs may be worth bearing if they cause enough efficient deterrence. The issue
is which system is socially most efficient given overall costs and benefits, which include
administrative and legal costs. The increase in accidents depends on the importance of victim’s
care and its response to changes in incentives. Exactly how much deterrence tort law provides
and the extent to which replacing the negligence rule with no fault insurance will increase
accident costs through reducing care and increasing activity levels is an empirical issue.
The literature finds tort liability provides a significant amount of deterrence, especially for
automobile accidents (see, for example, the summaries in Schwartz9, Dewees et al10; van
Velthoven11; Sloan and Chepke12; and Liao and White13). Not the least is the evidence on nofault insurance. The studies on no fault insurance usually examine the effect of a shift to no-fault
insurance on motor vehicle accident deaths, despite many no-fault schemes leaving tort liability
intact in death cases. The justification is the probabilistic nature of accidents – less care means
more accidents and some fraction will be fatal.14 The results differ greatly – some finding
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shifting to no-fault
fault in various states in the U.S. had no effect, others finding a 15 per cent
increase in deaths. That is to be expected, as the switch to no fault involves changes in liability
rules and in insurance arrangements. The effect of introducing no
no-fault
fault insurance depends on the
system before it was introduced (such as liability insurance arrangeme
arrangements)
nts) and the details of the
scheme introduced. For example, many schemes (as in NSW and Victoria) retain large elements
of tort law and provide relatively modest no
no-liability
liability benefits. For example, many no fault
schemes exclude damages for pain and sufferi
suffering, and so under-compensate
compensate victims (which
increases victim care).
The most relevant studies for the NIIS proposal examine the effects of a shift to a pure no
fault scheme that abolishes tort liability, as in New Zealand or for motor vehicles in Quebec and
a
the Northern Territory. Swan and McEwin15,16 present empirical evidence on the switch to nono
fault in New Zealand and the Northern Territory, compared to other states of Australia and find it
to be associated with a substantial increase of 16 to 20 perce
percent
nt in the number of road fatalities. In
Quebec, fatalities increased 3 – 9 per cent (see for example, van Velthoven and Dewees et al).
al 11
Hause finds little initial effect of the NZ scheme on overall fatality rates, but a modest long run
trend effect in increasing
reasing fatal accident rates over what they otherwise would have been.17
Clearly there is a trade-off
off that the Productivity Commission ignores. No fault insurance may
compensate victims better, but is likely to increase accident costs. It is a difficult policy issue –
what are the equity effects of helping those with catastrophic injuries, but creating more people
in those circumstances? It doesn’t help to assume the trade
trade-off doesn’t exist.
X.

Implications for Highway Expenditure

The prospect of substantial increases in traffic accidents has implications for the safety design
of road infrastructure, increasing the optimal amount of investment. If accident costs are A = A
(H,
H, Z) where Z is dangerous driving (a fall in driver care and increase in kilometres driven
increases Z) and H is investment in road infrastructure, where ∂A/∂H = AH < 0 and ∂A/∂Z = AZ
> 0. If H costs W per unit, then if we choose H to minimise A (H, Z) + WH then the first-order
first
condition for the optimal level of H, which minimises accident plus infrastructure costs, is AH
(H, Z) + W = 0.

Figure 1. Optimal highway investment.
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The introduction of no-fault insurance would increase Z. If AZH < 0 then an increase in Z from
the introduction of no fault insurance will make AH more negative and increase the optimal
amount of H (H and Z are substitutes). If Z is endogenous, then the rise in H will further increase
Z, which increases H further.
An increase in Z from Z0 to Z1 from the introduction of no-fault insurance shifts the A (H, Z)
curve up (from the blue to the green curves) and makes it steeper if AZH<0. This raises the
optimal H from X0* to X1*.
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